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The occasion of the 90th anniversary of Latvia’s declaration of independence seemed a 
suitable occasion to reflect on this author’s decade long commitment to studying the 
history of Latvia during the Second World War. In 2003 Routledge published Between 
Stalin and Hitler: Class War and Race War on the Dvina, 1940-46, a detailed case study 
of Latgale under Soviet and Nazi rule. Since then, two articles have appeared on the 
National Partisans: “Divided We Fall: Divisions within the National Partisans of 
Vidzeme and Latgale, Fall 1945”, Journal of Baltic Studies 38/2 2007 and “Latvia’s 
Democratic Resistance: a Forgotten Episode from the Second World War”, European 
History Quarterly 39/2 2009. Prior to that, in January 2004, there was also a short paper 
to the XIII Scientific Readings of the Humanities Faculty, Daugavpils University, on the 
subject “From Source to Person: the Case of Jānis Niedre”, published in Proceedings of 
the 13th International Scientific Readings of the Faculty of Humanities. History VII 
(Saule, Daugavpils 2004). These studies all focus on the power of the great ideologies of 
the twentieth century and the way those ideologies could justify the abandonment of 
accepted morality. Yet they also say something else about ideology: the years of Soviet 
and now post-Soviet historiography have drowned out the voices of those who did not 
quite fit in with the dominant ideologies of the time. 
 
The aim of this short paper, therefore, is to restore to the historical record the voices of 
some of those who have been marginalised or forgotten. Three examples are taken: the 
case of Jānis Niedre; the demands of Latvia’s former Red Partisans; and the decisions 
taken by many, possibly a majority of Latvia’s national partisans. 
 
The Niedre Case 
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The Niedre Case took place not on the 90th anniversary of Latvia’s declaration of 
independence, but an altogether less celebratory occasion, as preparations began to mark 
the 25th anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1943; it concerned events 
surrounding an article written by the Latvian communist and folklorist Jānis Niedre to 
mark that anniversary. Niedre’s name re-surfaced in September 2008. In that year the 
Journal of Baltic Studies published an article by Kevin Karnes on “Soviet Musicology 
and the ‘Nationalities Question’: the Case of Latvia”. Karnes commented on the moves 
made by the Latvian musical and cultural establishment during the Soviet era to discover 
folksongs outlining the long-standing friendship between the Latvian and Russian 
peoples, and one essay he chose to consider was written by Jānis Niedre for the collection 
Karogs published in 1942. In this essay Niedre referred to the words of the following folk 
song:  
 
I gave my sister to a Russian, and myself took a Lithuanian bride, among the 
Russians, among the Lithuanians, everywhere I find friends and relatives.1 
 
However genuine or not the folksong, Niedre’s choice of subject matter seemed 
particularly appropriate for a communist apparatchik, an unthinking pro-Soviet lackey. 
And may be that is what Niedre was in 1942, but a year later he had become an extremely 
unreliable communist. On 15 December 1943 Niedre was expelled from the Latvian 
Communist Party for a nationalist deviation. His expulsion was the result of an article he 
had written for Moscow Radio’s Latvian service to commemorate the 25th anniversary of 
Latvian independence.2 
 
Niedre was born on 24 May 1909 not far from Krustpils, and then went on to study at the 
primary school in Līvani, before moving to a secondary school in Jēkabpils. As an adult, 
he then became a Social Democrat, joining the party in 1929. A student of both history 
and economics, in 1932 he joined the writer’s and journalists’ union and became involved 
in publishing left-wing papers. He stayed a member of the Social Democrats until 
President Ulmanis rounded up Left-wing activists in the aftermath of his coup on 15 May 
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1934. In prison he at once joined the Communist Party and when, like many others 
arrested at that time, he was released in 1937, he formally left the Social Democrats in 
1938 and devoted himself to communist politics. In June 1940, after Soviet troops took 
control of the country, Niedre was elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet and a junior 
member of the government working on press and publications, and a founder member of 
the Union of Writers. When the Nazi invasion began a year later, Niedre was one of those 
Soviet officials important enough to be evacuated from Latvia, and in exile he was given 
the job of Secretary of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet. It was in this 
capacity that he was also required to provide material for Moscow Radio’s Latvian 
broadcasts. He worked in this post until his dismissal in November 1943 and his 
expulsion from the Party the following month. The affair did not completely blight 
Niedre’s career. After the war he continued his work as a Soviet deputy, and pursued his 
interest in folklore, becoming deputy director of the Institute of Folklore of the Latvian 
Academy of Sciences. 3 
 
The “crime” which led to Niedre’s expulsion was this: he had written for broadcast, and 
forwarded to the relevant broadcasting authorities, the Soviet Information Bureau 
(Sovinburo) and the Radio Committee, two articles which he had claimed had been 
endorsed by the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, but which in reality 
had never received its endorsement. Leaving aside the question of how perfunctory the 
Central Committee’s procedures were or were not for vetting such broadcast articles, this 
was not a simple question of procedure; it was the content of what Niedre had written that 
was the problem. One of the two articles concerned the Education Minister under 
Ulmanis and writer on national matters Atis ĖeniĦš, who was, it was felt, portrayed in far 
too positive a light, given the fact that ĖeniĦš had been arrested and exiled as a counter-
revolutionary . The other article was the more topical, and concerned the significance of 
the date 18 November 1918 on its approaching 25th anniversary. 
 
What precisely did Niedre say about the date in 1918 on which Latvia’s independence 
was declared? Well, first of all it should be borne in mind that this was an important 
anniversary to mark because, unlike in 1942, the German occupation authorities had 
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agreed that lavish celebrations could take place throughout Latvia, culminating in a 
march past by the Latvian Legion in Riga and a special performance by the Riga Opera.4 
Niedre clearly felt that Soviet Radio had to take cognisance of this and address head-on 
what the significance of the date was for a majority of Latvians. So he described the 
regime which owed its origins to the declaration of 18 November 1918 as a democratic 
republic “proclaimed by many groups of the Latvian people”. He then looked at its most 
positive features, drawing an unfavourable comparison with the Ulmanis dictatorship by 
stressing that the inter-war parliamentary republic had given wide representation to the 
country’s ethnic minorities.  
 
However, the most controversial part of the planned broadcast came when he then went 
on to suggest that the events of summer 1940 had simply been about restoring to Latvians 
the democratic rights that had been lost under Ulmanis, explaining that the People’s 
Government of 1940 “embodied the ideals of 1918”. The short-lived Latvian Soviet 
Republic of 1919 was scarcely mentioned, nor was the incorporation of Latvia into the 
Soviet Union in autumn 1940. The clear implication of what Niedre wrote was that, as 
the future of Latvia came back on to the international agenda after the success of the Red 
Army at Stalingrad, the re-incorporation into the Soviet Union was not the only option.5 
 
What made Niedre act in the way that he did? To the leader of the Latvian Communist 
Party Jānis KalnberziĦš there was little to explain. As he informed N. N. Shatalin, then 
the Deputy Head of Cadres in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) but in 
autumn 1944 to become the head of the Chairman of the Bureau for Latvia (Latburo), the 
Niedre case proved that all former Social Democrats were quite simply unreliable.6 
However, another explanation seems more plausible: both Niedre and KalnberziĦš were 
caught out by an important shift in the ideological agenda between Stalin’s speech on 6 
November 1943 when he looked forward to the reincorporation of the Baltic States into 
the Soviet Union, and the “Anti-Fascist Meeting of the Latvian People” held in Moscow 
on 12 December 1943 when he acted as if this were a fair accompli when he allowed the 
President of Soviet Latvia Augusts Kirhenšteins to state that it would not be long before 
“the Red Army frees our beautiful Latvia”.7 
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Red Partisans as National Communists 
 
There are other signs that Niedre was not a lone former Social Democrat communist 
dissident, but in fact the voice of a vanished communist orthodoxy. Niedre had dropped 
reference to things “Soviet”, and had stressed the popular front nature of the People’s 
Government established in June 1940, and similar views were well established by 1943 
among Latvia’s Soviet partisans. When in 1942 the first attempts had been made to 
establish a Red Partisan movement in Latvia, Party propaganda had constantly used the 
word “Soviet”; leaflets had ended “Long live free Soviet Latvia!” or “Long live Stalin!”. 
In 1943 the propaganda used by the Red Partisans had dropped all this. In fact, in many 
ways it was similar to that of any other communist party operating in occupied Europe: 
the communists stressed national themes; leaflets were circulated signed by Orthodox 
Church bishops, calling for the defence of Christian civilisation, the words “brothers and 
sisters” replaced “comrades” and all appeals to join the Red Partisans ended “Long live 
the freedom loving Latvian people and its gallant patriots”.8  
 
This line was established when a Latvian Communist Party Central Committee 
delegation to the Red Partisans arrived at their Belarus base on 21 January 1943, led by 
Kārlis OzoliĦš and Milda Birkenfelde. In a report to Soviet Partisan HQ on 25 April 1943 
OzoliĦš stressed that “there are only a few Hitlerites”, that most “bourgeois” nationalists 
looked to England and Sweden; the message from the Central Committee was “to make 
contact with Latvian associations of patriots and influence them to struggle more actively 
against the Germans, in the direction we wish”.9 Fulfilling these instructions, the most 
successful of the Red Partisans leaders deliberately sought out representatives of the 
national partisans and tried to open talks with them. Wilhelms LaiviĦš, who had 
commanded the “For a Soviet Latvia” regiment when it tried to march from Soviet 
territory back into Latvia in July 1942, was one of those keen to open talks with the 
nationalists towards the end of 1943; he recalled, however, in an interview recorded in 
December 1944 that the only place where formal talks actually took place was near 
Valka. 
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We held talks with the nationalists. We met them and held talks. It took place in 
Valka District. In other districts we just could not make contact. At that time the 
nationalists were split, breaking up into separate groups. There the Valka HQ had 
a secretary and we held talks. We met with them and tried to persuade them to 
fight.10 
 
 Otomar Oškalns, who had been the commissar for LaiviĦš in summer 1942, was only 
slightly more successful: on 10 November 1943 he held talks with national partisans near 
Birzgale. The group he met was linked to the Latvija underground resistance newspaper. 
He recalled rather bashfully that the meeting had begun by singing the “bourgeois” 
Latvian national anthem. Although disappointed that the talks seemed to get nowhere – 
the national partisans were determined to co-ordinate their activity with their leadership 
in Sweden and the possible intervention of the Western Allies – Oškalns decided to keep 
in touch; later in spring 1944 he even co-operated with an armed nationalist group in 
resisting a German attack. As he told his interviewer: “I would have given anything to 
make contact with them, but was unable to do so”.11 
 
These flirtations with a popular front approach to politics, and the implied suggestion that 
what would be restored in Latvia at the end of the war was a People’s Government rather 
than a Soviet Government, were brought to an end in December 1943. It was an open 
secret that the future of the Baltic States was discussed at the meeting of the three Allied 
Foreign Ministers held in Moscow on 19-30 October 1943. Stalin then used his October 
Revolution anniversary speech on 6 November to lay claim to the Baltic State once more, 
and at the Tehran Conference of the Big Three from 28 November to 1 December 1943 
Stalin was indeed promised by Roosevelt that the Baltic States would be his.12 There was 
no more need for any talk of developing a popular front strategy for Latvia. 
 
How seriously should we take the declarations of Niedre, LaiviĦš and Oškalns? Was it an 
early outburst of national communism within the Latvian Communist Party? Niedre in 
particular, and LaiviĦš and Oškalns as things evolved, were caught out by the changed 
Party line between November and December 1943 when the question of the re-
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incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union changed from being an open to a 
closed question. It would be possible to argue that there is nothing more at stake here 
than the dictates of Party discipline: communists followed a popular front style strategy 
when told to, and dropped it when told to. This must inevitably have been the case for 
some, but there seems to be more in it than that because those associated with the Red 
Partisan movement would become troublesome comrades in the immediate post-war 
years. Birkenfelde, who travelled in early 1943 with OzoliĦš to represent the Central 
Committee among the Latvian Red Partisans, proved after the war to be a real member of 
the awkward squad. 
 
Milda Birkenfelde (née Dzervite) was born in 1903 near Vecate into the family of an 
agricultural worker. She joined the Latvian Communist Party in 1921 in nearby 
Mazsalaca, and after two years activity emigrated to the Soviet Union, where in 1928 she 
graduated from KUNMZ and returned to Latvia as Komsomol organiser in Riga. Arrested 
the following year, she spent ten years in prison, moving on her release to organise the 
communist underground in Sēlpils near Jēkabpils and heading the party’s Daugava 
regional organisation. Active in welcoming the Red Army in June 1940 and organising 
popular demonstrations to demand the removal of Ulmanis and friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union, she was an obvious choice for rapid promotion and by August she had 
been elected First Secretary of the Jēkabpils District LCP Committee. Her Second 
Secretary was Otomar Oškalns, the future Red Partisan leader, and together with him she 
formed an ad hoc military brigade which fought its way to Soviet territory when trapped 
by the speed of the German advance. After her three months with the Latvian partisans in 
1943, it was logical that in July 1944 she should return with the Red Army and take up 
once again the post of Secretary of the Jēkabpils District Secretary.13 Her dramatic life 
story meant that she had no qualms about calling a spade a spade. At the V Plenum of the 
LCP Central Committee on 25-6 August 1944, she immediately went on to the attack, 
criticising the behaviour of the security forces.  
 
Birkenfelde argued that the “first duty” of the NKVD and NKGB should be to help 
restore links with the local population, the clear implication of her remarks being that this 
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was not yet happening and the security services were in fact undermining the tenuous 
links the communists had with the local population.14 Later in the discussion she was 
even clearer about the need to work with, rather than against the local population. She 
stated: 
 
There are very many people who waited for us, who fought the Germans in some 
way or another, and they must be found, trusted and included in constructing 
Soviet power. We must work with them. If we rely only on the aktiv which has 
come from the Soviet Union, we will achieve nothing.15 
 
Birkenfelde was not alone in her concern at the way Soviet power was being re-
established. At the VI Plenum on 15-16 November 1944 the Valka District Secretary 
Fricis Bergs, another former partisan, complained about the behaviour of the Red Army, 
much to the fury of Party leader KalnbērziĦš who commented: “Comrade Bergs carried 
out heroic deeds working among the partisan detachments in the rear of the enemy. And 
now he is embarrassed by Soviet power. It is shameful for a district secretary to say such 
things.”16 
 
Birkenfelde continued to voice her concerns at the way Soviet power was being 
implemented in Latvia. Almost two years later, at the XII Plenum on 18-19 July 1946, 
she had another clash with the leadership when she stated: 
 
It has to be said, that the greater part of our leading workers, both the Russians and 
those Latvians from the old republics, do not have a feel for the class struggle 
which is taking place with us. For them, all Latvians are as grey as cats, they cannot 
distinguish the difference in thought of a middle peasant or a kulak and put 
everything down to the national question. Their position is incorrect.17  
 
Such views did not go down well with the Latburo, the Party institution established by 
Moscow to oversee the work of the Latvian Communist Party. As early as a meeting 
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between district party secretaries and representatives of the security organs held on 2 
April 1945 the then Latburo leader Shatalin commented: 
 
Even among party activists there are manifestations of local nationalism, 
manifestations of bourgeois nationalism, when comrades misunderstand our mutual 
relations and the current help we are giving. Our help is not always accepted as it 
should be, sometimes it is accepted with ill-grace and here and there you hear such 
things as: why have they come, and sometimes much ruder things.18 
 
The re-surfacing of such views fifteen months later was not welcome, particularly since it 
coincided with other signs of nationalism among leading party members. By autumn 
1946 the Latburo was increasingly concerned about the Third Secretary of the Central 
Committee J. Jurgens. Addressing a republican conference of local soviet chairmen, he 
made a series of statements that, while self-evidently true, were at variance with Soviet 
propaganda and which suggested to the LCP’s Moscow minders a common stance with 
bourgeois nationalism. The starting point Jurgens took for discussing the current tasks 
faced by soviet chairmen was the fact that the situation faced in 1946 was far harder than 
that faced in 1940 because the country “had been emptied”. Things were made worse 
because “our people is no longer the people of 1905, 1917 or 1919; the revolutionary 
mood there was then no longer exists”. He conceded that some peasants had lived well 
under Ulmanis, and saw it as understandable that they did not approve the Soviet land 
reform, since no one liked having their property taken away. It was his view that “we 
must win the personal respect of all peasants” and drew no distinction between kulaks 
and peasants.19 
 
Even though Birkenfelde and her Jēkabpils district colleagues were pioneers of collective 
farm construction in Latvia, the Latburo felt that she was tainted with nationalism 
because she tended to see the Latvian peasantry as suffering in common rather than being 
sharply differentiated between the rich kulak and the rest. When the Latburo held its only 
formal meeting on 21 October 1946 to assess the state of the harvest in light of the 
growing threat of famine in the USSR, it reminded the LCP Central Committee that 
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failure to meet harvest targets in the current situation would be considered a state crime 
and that any failure to deliver the harvest was a direct result of sabotage by kulaks. In this 
situation, an incorrect attitude to the kulak danger was impermissible. Birkenfelde was 
among those district party secretaries criticised. The new Latburo chief V F Ryazanov 
demanded that at least one district party secretary be sacked as a warning to others and 
reminded those present of rumours that Birkenfelde’s husband was effectively a kulak 
who, through relatives, controlled at least three farms. The implication was clear, 
Birkenfelde was soft on kulaks because of personal circumstances. In the end it was 
Jurgens who was sacked, because he had also been associated with a group of veteran 
party members who remained loyal to KalnberziĦš’s predecessor as party leader.20 
Birkenfelde’s punishment was to be issued with a party penalty for her anti-party attitude 
to the kulaks.21 It would appear that after receiving this warning, Birkenfelde was 
demoted to raion level work, but later appointed District Party Secretary for Jelgava. She 
retired in 1954.22 
 
National Partisans and Surrender 
 
The most controversial comment made by Jurgens at that conference of local soviet 
chairmen did not in fact relate to the kulaks, but the national partisans, or “bandits” as 
they were always referred to in Soviet documents. Jurgens told the local soviet chairmen: 
“we could put the army into every forest to destroy every last bandit, but we think, 
however sad the fact, that they are our Latvians too”. It seems certain that it was this 
apparent sympathy for the national partisans that was the ultimate cause of his dismissal. 
However, he concluded those remarks with the comment: “may be they will understand 
and leave the forest; those who do not, we will have to destroy”. It was always part of 
Soviet strategy to encourage national partisans to surrender their weapons and leave the 
forests. Why so many did so is not something that has really been explored by historians. 
Since 1991 it has seemed more important to extend the time-scale of national partisan 
activity into the mid 1950s, rather than to consider why, after such a dramatic beginning, 
the national partisan movement dwindled to become little more than an irritant to Soviet 
power. The key to understanding the success of the Soviet calls for national partisans to 
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leave the forests is to remember that these calls were not issued by the Soviet authorities 
alone. 
 
When Oškalns held his talks with national partisans in Birzgale in 1943, he felt the 
national partisans had no real leadership, no real centre. That was not the case. The 
national partisans to whom he talked owed allegiance to the Latvian Central Council and 
it had simply taken a policy decision not to talk to the communists. The story of the 
Latvian Central Council is well known. Formed in August 1943, it brought together the 
leaders of Latvia’s pre-Ulmanis democratic republic, uniting democrats, Christian 
democrats and socialists, but excluding the communists as a point of principle. Its 
strategy was simple: it would make contact with Latvia’s diplomats abroad and on the 
basis of such contacts, prepare for a national uprising to begin after the Red Army had 
crossed into Latvia; supported by the Swedes and British, the uprising would begin in 
Kurzeme and as it got under way a new national government for Latvia would be 
declared; for safety’s sake, most of the members of that planned government would 
already have been smuggled to security in Sweden before the uprising began.  
 
Often held to ridicule because of its reliance on British and Swedish support, which was 
not in the event forthcoming, and the fact that before the insurrection could begin, its 
leader General Jānis Kurelis was arrested by the Nazis in November 1944, it should be 
remembered that the Latvian Central Council always had a reserve strategy, and that 
reserve strategy began to be successfully implemented early in 1945. The reserve strategy 
was to prepare an army of national partisan forces throughout Latvia, which would stand 
ready to act when the western Allies entered the Baltic Sea. This event was anticipated as 
taking place in March 1945 when the Germans began to withdraw from Norway and the 
Allies began to make moves to open up a northern front for the final assault on Berlin, 
from bases to be established in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. When none of these 
developments materialised either, the national partisan forces had to consider whether or 
not to continue their operations or stand down.23 
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Over the summer of 1945 the national partisans loyal to the Latvian Central Council 
leadership in Sweden came close to representing the nation. In the 1960s and afterwards 
it suited Soviet analysts to build up the links that existed between some Latvian national 
partisans and the Germans; but it is beyond question that from autumn 1944 to autumn 
1945 the dominant groups among the national partisans were those linked to Sweden and 
the Latvian Central Council; as the certainty of German defeat became clearer, so those 
who had initially fought with German support looked to Sweden and the Allies too. The 
biggest national partisan group the Latvian Fatherland Guards (partisans) Union (LTSpA) 
saw itself as an umbrella linking all regions of Latvia, with a common democratic 
programme, linked to Christian ideals, thus echoing the participation of Bishop Jāzeps 
Rancāns in the Latvian Central Council. The LTSpA brought together the traditions of 
Latgale Christian democracy and aizsarg nationalism, just as the Latvian Central Council 
had brought back Ulmanis’s Peasant Union back into the political fold; it united those 
who had resisted both the Nazis and the Soviets, with those who had resisted only the 
Soviets. The LTSpA was a political as well as a military organisation. Although it is 
questionable whether much was ever done in this regard, the LTSpA saw it as essential to 
operate a “Self Help” organisation, to give support to the families of those suffering 
under Soviet oppression. Thus over summer 1945 it stressed the need for political work 
to be undertaken among the peasantry in order to organise a boycott of deliveries to the 
Soviet state. The LTSpA was strong enough to circulate 2,000 copies of its newsletter, 
and in this it identified its support base as “democratically inclined Latvians”. It always 
stressed the word “democratic”, and was keen to associate itself with the work of Latvia’s 
last ambassador to Britain, Kārlis ZariĦš.24  
 
Latvia’s national partisans were buoyed up by developments at the Potsdam Conference 
of the Big Three on July-August 1945. They interpreted the fact that Stalin had been 
forced at the conference to include members of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the 
new Polish Coalition Government as a clear sign that Britain was taking a firm stand 
against Stalin. Rumours at once began to circulate that British military intervention was 
imminent. What destroyed the LTSpA was the failure of that British military intervention 
to materialise. The zenith of LTSpA activity came at the end of September, when British 
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troops were reported to have landed on Latvian soil; moves to appoint a new provisional 
government began at once. It seems clear in the case of Antons Juhnēvičs, the leader of 
the LTSpA, that the failure of any British forces to materialise persuaded him not only to 
leave the LTSpA himself, but to issue an appeal for his followers to surrender as well. He 
was not alone. Arvids Puids, adjutant to the LTSpA Second Division, surrendered once 
he became convinced that no real contacts existed between the LTSpA and Sweden and 
Britain. The Ilūkste commander Stanislaws Urbans and his Chief of Staff both 
surrendered at about the same time. All those who surrendered expressed concern that a 
level of violence which was acceptable in the context of foreign military intervention, 
could not be justified if the national partisans faced the Red Army alone; reprisals would 
lead to the shedding of too much innocent blood, forcing the national partisans to turn to 
robbery to survive. To paraphrase the words of Juhnēvičs: good friends were dying in 
pursuit of a wrong tactic, based on violence and theft.25 
 
However, by October 1945 the call to leave the forests was not only emanating from the 
official Soviet statements about possible amnesties, for a full understanding of the 
decision of so many national partisans to leave the forests, it is essential to keep in mind 
that the advice to lay down arms did not only come from the Soviet side. The message 
that the Latvian Central Council was sending from Sweden at this time was very clear: 
the international situation meant that an uprising in Latvia could not be sustained; 
therefore, military units should be preserved but stood down and instead of military 
action a broad underground network needed to be established to keep the national idea 
alive until the international climate improved. This was the agreed position of the Latvian 
Central Council in July 1945 at it tried to restore contact with Latvia from its Swedish 
base. It leaders concurred: “in the near future, disagreements are hardly likely to arise 
between the Allies [so] … we must prepare for the future; armed struggle by the Latvian 
people against Soviet power would only be harmful and lead to nothing”. When the 
Latvian Central Council emissary arrived in Riga in October, his message was quickly 
passed on to national partisans meeting in Vidzeme, and from them to the national 
partisans in Latgale. The message stated: 
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To the command staff of the national partisans of Latvia. I order you not to 
engage in heavy fighting with the Red Terror. Preserve your strength… demand 
from you subordinates the strictest discipline allowing no theft, arson or similar 
actions which will bring harm to our people… Until the moment when foreign 
states intervene to restore the independence of the Baltic States by force of arms, 
be passive in your attitude to the Soviet authorities, preserve your lives and 
organisation and wait for instructions from abroad to begin active operations”.26  
 
Of course, the national partisans did continue to fight after autumn 1945, but increasingly 
those still in the forests distanced themselves from the democratic programme of the 
Latvian Central Council. In May 1946, national partisans belonging to the Latvian 
National Partisan Union (LNPA), which by then had supplanted the LTSpA as the 
dominant national partisan force, issued a statement to commemorate thirteen years since 
the Ulmanis coup. It was a peon of praise: on this “unforgettable day”, it stated “class 
government” was replaced by “national government”, a dream that had been achieved 
“without bloodshed”; by his action Ulmanis had unfurled “the banner of Latvia’s new 
democratic republic”.27 Such statement played into the hands of Soviet propagandists 
determined to stress the aizsarg nature of the national partisans, and helped silence the 




What conclusion can be drawn from these loosely connected events - Niedre, the party 
dogmatist who rejected Latvia’s sovietisation; Red Partisans who acted like national 
communists before their time; national partisans who left the forests on the advice of 
Latvia’s democratic politicians rather than surrendering to the Soviet administration? 
Such events suggest that at the end of the Second World War there were, on both sides of 
the ideological divide, what might be termed “moderate” elements, people who wanted to 
prevent civil war between Latvians more than anything else. That, surely, was the 
message behind the controversial statement Jurgens made about “bandits”: “we could put 
the army into every forest to destroy every last bandit, but we think, however sad the fact, 
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that they are our Latvians too”. This concern for the fate of fellow Latvians was 
reminiscent of the policy adopted during the war by the Red Partisan leader Oškalns: it 
was his policy never to open fire first on patrols of the Latvian Legion.28 
  
In a different context, Andrew Ezergailis has written about the “missing centre” in 
Latvia, and that was the impact of the Cold War as well; political views which might be 
quite close one to another in a democratic society, were pulled to the extremes of Left 
and Right. As the Cold War developed, there was no chance of the “national partisans” 
from the Soviet partisan movement establishing contact let alone a common cause with 
the “Swedish” element of the national partisans, even though in a different context their 
views, a mixture of Left and democratic politics, would have seemed rather close. Voices 
such as these simply disappeared, and Cold War historiography became set in stone. An 
important milestone in the dismantling that Cold War historiography was taken by 
Ezergailis when he wrote his Nazi/Soviet Disinformation about the Holocaust in Latvia: 
Daugavas vanagi, who are they revisited (Riga, Occupation Museum of Latvia, 2005). 
This study goes a long way to demolishing the Soviet propaganda myth that there was a 
direct connection between those involved in murdering Jews in Latvia, those who led the 
national partisans in the immediate post-war years and those who headed the Latvian 
anti-Soviet emigration in the 1960s.  
 
However, there are other Cold War myths which need addressing. In Latvia’s post-
independence popular writing, and in some academic writing too, communists are 
considered nothing more than Soviet agents, that the Latvian Communist Party had any 
roots within Latvia itself is simply denied. Such an approach means not only that the 
voices of the Red Partisans who were national communists before their time are not being 
be heard, but also that the voice of any Latvian idealist, who mistakenly saw in the model 
of the Soviet Union a solution to their own country’s problems of social and national 
inequality, is also not going to be heard. Even Augusts Kirhenšteins, the man the Soviet 
Union made President of Latvia in July 1940 and thereafter Chairman of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet, could fall into this category. In 1946 a report from the Latburo to the 
Soviet Politburo revealed: 
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He chatters a lot about how they have put the Latvian people in prison, have 
pursued a policy of destruction in Latvia, and other bourgeois nationalist 
nonsense. Kirhenšteins often supports people with anti-Soviet views and is 
particularly close to the reactionary section of the intelligentsia attached to the 
university, the academy of sciences, and the institute of medicine.29 
 
It is not time, 90 years after the declaration of Latvia’s independence, to rehabilitate 
Kirhenšteins, but it is time to recognise that even Kirhenšteins was a product of his time, 
a time when the ideological struggle between fascism and communism attracted many 
idealists to the communist cause, only to discover that the communist cause and the 
machinations of the Soviet system were by no means one and the same thing. Yet some 
of those idealists learned how to survive within the Soviet machine and live to fight 
another day when Khrushchev began his experiment with reform communism. Now, 90 
years after the declaration of Latvian independence, it is important to hear the voices of 
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